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WILLIAM B. FISCH*
Plurality of Political Opinion and the Concentration
of Media in the United Statest
This paper reviews regulatory efforts of the U.S. federal govern-
ment to promote viewpoint diversity in broadcast media (radio,
television, cable, and satellite) in the face of increasing concentration
of ownership of such media, and the impact on such efforts of the free-
doms of speech and press embodied in the First Amendment to the
federal constitution. With respect to this issue, the regulatory work has
been done overwhelmingly by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, operating under an act of Congress which has been amended
from time to time to push the FCC in particular directions. The anti-
trust laws are applicable to the media, but they have not been used
explicitly to address the issue of viewpoint diversity. The regulations,
under the statutory rubric of "the public interest," have broadly ad-
dressed two dimensions of the media: programming content and
concentration of media ownership. The dominant political theme of
the last thirty years has been deregulation, but remnants of the earlier
era persist and may be regaining favor, while the constitutional pa-
rameters are unsettled in important respects. The FCC invoked the
First Amendment along with market policies in abandoning most of
its efforts to regulate content, but the courts have yet to fully endorse
its view (adopted in 1987) that the constitution required it, and some
statutory rules have remained on the books. Limiting the number of
media outlets a particular person or enterprise can own has presented
fewer First Amendment problems, and the FCC's deregulation has re-
lied mostly on raising the permitted numbers; but it has been unable
to persuade the courts that any particular formula of ownership limi-
tation is rationally related to the overriding goal of viewpoint
diversity, so that statutory rules which were meant to prod the agency
into further deregulation have ironically remained as limitations.
Increasing concentration of ownership of mass media (newspa-
pers, radio, and television) raises the question of access to such media
for a variety of viewpoints on matters of public concern not shared or
accommodated by the existing owners or managers. The question pre-
supposes that other options for the holder of a particular viewpoint to
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reach the same or a comparable audience-or to respond to a view-
point expressed or accommodated by the owners/managers-are
impracticable or otherwise foreclosed. Does the legal system under
such circumstances impose an enforceable duty on the media owners
to accommodate other viewpoints, to refrain from mergers or acquisi-
tions of competing media that would have the effect of limiting the
range of viewpoints that can be effectively expressed, or to downsize
so as to make room for others? To what extent is any such duty de-
fined or limited by constitutional protections of freedom of speech and
press, as distinguished from ordinary legislation?
In the United States, this issue has a long history generating an
enormous literature which can only be hinted at in a report of this
nature. Nonetheless, an historical overview is important, because it
provides examples of efforts-mostly less than completely success-
ful-to deal with a persistent problem of access to media which ebbs
and flows with the introduction and maturity of new technologies.
The report will concentrate primarily on the more or less traditional
mass media, and specifically on the federally regulated broadcast me-
dia, which is where most of the legal action has been. The internet
has entered the current debate frequently as an effective alternative
forum, although the heavy involvement of private internet service
providers itself presents its own question not yet fully resolved: may
these providers limit subscribers' access to material otherwise availa-
ble on the net?
I. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. Freedom of Speech and Press under the Federal Constitution
The starting place for evaluating any media regulatory scheme
concerned with content and editorial policies today is the First
Amendment of the federal constitution, which forbids government to
infringe the freedom of speech or of the press.1 The two freedoms are
closely related, and reflect two dimensions of their purpose: on the
one hand the freedom of speakers/publishers to speak or otherwise
express themselves, and on the other the interest of the public in ac-
cess to the fullest possible range of ideas, information and opinions on
matters of public concern.2
1. The precise text in relevant part is as follows: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . ." This provision has been inter-
preted (1) as literally applicable to any act of any agency of the federal government,
and (2) as applicable, by virtue of the "due process" clause of the 14th Amendment, to
all agencies of state and local governments as well. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925).
2. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 633-4 (1994):"...
[A] ssuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a gov-
ernmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values that are central to the
First Amendment."
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For the present issue of viewpoint diversity, it is important to
note further that these constitutional freedoms are freedoms from
government infringement only.3 A private media owner does not vio-
late the constitutional right of another private speaker by refusing to
accommodate that person's viewpoint. Since the great majority of
traditional mass media are privately owned, therefore, the predomi-
nant legal question is the extent to which government may, by
legislation and regulation, impose obligations and limitations on
them in the interest of maximizing the range of information and
viewpoints available to the public.
The federal Constitution itself does not define either "freedom of
speech" or "freedom of the press," and neither freedom had a precise,
fully developed legal meaning at the time of adoption of the First
Amendment in 1791. For the most part, therefore, subsequent inter-
pretation provides the detail, and virtually all of the U.S. Supreme
Court's work in this regard has occurred within the last century.
Three of the most basic principles currently applied by the Court to
government restrictions on speech and the press are worthy of men-
tion here. First, the protections of speech and press are not absolute,
but restrictions on a given activity are subjected to a means-ends
analysis which measures the legitimacy and importance of the gov-
ernment's interest in restricting the activity against the nature and
degree of the restriction. 4 Second, the Court distinguishes generally
between regulations which are based on the content of the speech and
those that are content-neutral, imposing a higher burden of justifica-
tion on the former than on the latter. Content-based restrictions are
usually said to require a compelling governmental purpose and a nar-
row tailoring of the restriction to achieve that purpose. 5 Content-
neutral restrictions are said to require an important or substantial
governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free
speech, and an incidental restriction of speech that is no greater than
necessary to protect that interest.6 Third, "prior restraints" on publi-
cation-such as licensing or censorship or a judicial injunction
against publication-are the most difficult of all restrictions to jus-
tify.7 The distinction between content-based and content-neutral
restrictions is of the most recent origin, not fully articulated until
well after our regulatory story begins.
3. See JOHN E. NOwAK AND RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (7th ed.
2004) (hereinafter "Nowak & Rotunda"), sec. 16.1.
4. Id. at sec. 16.7.
5. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
6. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
7. The leading modern case on "prior restraints" is Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931), involving a statutorily authorized injunction, with references to the ear-
lier history. Licensing as a prerequisite to the right to print, as practiced by the
English crown until its abandonment in the 17th century, is a classic infringement.
See Nowak & Rotunda, n. 3 above, at p. 1144.
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B. Federal Communications Commission
Broadcast media (radio and television, including satellite and
cable television) in the United States are subject to the licensing au-
thority of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), created
by an Act of Congress in 1934 which also created a framework of reg-
ulation for the Commission to administer, including the power to
make implementing regulations.8 The FCC was preceded by a Fed-
eral Radio Commission (FRC) created in 19279 with similar authority
but a technologically narrower mandate; the FCC's initial domain in-
cluded interstate telephone and telegraph transmission as well as
radio/television, 10 and has expanded to keep up with new technolo-
gies. The Radio Commission itself had been a response to the failure
of the first system of federal licensing of broadcast media under the
Radio Act of 1912, which had tried to control the overlapping and
mutual interference of signals by requiring a license from the Depart-
ment of Commerce, but did not provide the Secretary with power to
control the frequencies used.' 1
The Communications Act of 1934 expressly acknowledges the rel-
evance of the First Amendment to its regulatory system:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood or construed to
give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio
communications or signals transmitted by any radio station,
and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed
by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of
free speech by means of radio communication.12
The rationale for the licensing system as such, in relation to the First
Amendment's traditional prohibition against prior restraints, was
8. Communications Act of 1934, June 19, 1934, c. 652, 48 Stat. 1088, now codi-
fied as amended at 47 U.S.C. ss. 151 ff. (2002) The most important amendments to the
Act itself-primarily aimed at loosening regulatory burdens and increasing competi-
tion in the telephone industry-were adopted in the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub.L. 104-104, Title I s. 104, 110 Stat. 86.
9. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), sec. 3.
10. The FRC considered "picture and television broadcasts" as within its purview
virtually from the start, issued the first television broadcast license in 1928, and im-
posed restrictions on the permissible frequencies for "picture and television
broadcasts" as early as 1929. See ALBERT ABRAMSON, THE HISTORY OF TELEVISION,
1880 TO 1941 (1987), at 112 and 128.
11. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (C.A.D.C. 1923) (FRC must select a
frequency for any qualified applicant, with discretion only to choose the one that least
interferes with others). U.S. V. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (D.C. Ill. 1926) (li-
cense need only designate a "normal wavelength" that would not preclude the use of
others by the licensee). For overviews and references on this development, see e.g.,
FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD Guys AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 15-17
(1976) (hereinafter "Friendly, Good Guys"); CHARLES H. TILLINGHAST, AMERICAN
BROADCAST REGULATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: ANOTHER LOOK 41-47 (2000)
(hereinafter "Tillinghast, Another Look").
12. 47 U.S.C. s. 326 (2008), a provision carried over from the Radio Act of 1927.
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the nature of the medium. There are only so many places on the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum, and they cannot be occupied by more than one
broadcaster at a time in any given area without mutually destructive
interference. Only government regulation can control traffic on the
spectrum, so as to ensure the maximum effective use.13
C. Competition Laws (Antitrust)
As economic enterprises, all media companies-whether other-
wise regulated or not-are presumptively subject to the federal
antitrust laws 14 to the extent that their activities are in or affect com-
merce among the several states or with foreign states. 15 Two federal
agencies are primarily involved with enforcement of federal laws
against anti-competitive practices: the Department of Justice headed
by the Attorney General, 16 and the Federal Trade Commission (an
independent regulatory agency created in 1914). 17
The Communications Act confirms the applicability of these laws
to broadcast media, notwithstanding the FCC's regulatory jurisdic-
tion,18 and the courts have held that the FCC itself does not have
authority directly to apply the basic antitrust laws as such, even
though its mandate requires it to take competitive factors into ac-
count.19 Moreover, its own regulatory powers are not comprehensive
enough to warrant giving it primary competence (ahead of the anti-
trust agencies) over competition issues within its mandate, 20 and it
13. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 226-7 (1943).
14. These laws prohibit monopolies, combinations and other acts in restraint of
interstate or international trade, including mergers and acquisitions having such ef-
fects, currently codified in 15 U.S.C. ss 1 ff. (2004). The original law was the Sherman
Act of 1890, now codified in 15 U.S.C. ss 1-7. The Clayton Act of 1914, now codified at
15 U.S.C. ss. 12-27, introduced, in addition to substantive amendments, a comprehen-
sive remedial structure including private rights of action by persons injured by
violations of the law.
15. See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. V. U.S., 342 U.S. 143 (1951), holding that a local
newspaper engaged in gathering news from around the country and the world and
distributing it in a particular community is engaged in interstate commerce, and that
its activity seeking to persuade advertisers to boycott a competing local radio station
constituted an attempt to monopolize.
16. The responsible unit within the Department is the Antitrust Division, headed
by an Assistant Attorney General. See http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/.
17. The responsible subunit in the FTC is the Bureau of Competition. See http:l
www.ftc.gov/bc/about.shtm.
18. Federal Communications Act (47 U.S.C.) sec. 313. The section also authorizes
any court that has determined that a licensee has violated any of the antitrust laws to
order the license revoked, and directs the FCC to deny a license or construction per-
mit to anyone whose license has been so revoked by a court.
19. U.S. v. Radio Corp. Of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959), holding that the FCC's
findings with respect to competition issues are governed by the statutory standard of
"the public interest," and that FCC approval of an exchange of television stations be-
tween licensees did not foreclose a Justice Department suit asserting antitrust
violations.
20. Packaged Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 255 F2d 708 (3d
Cir. 1958). For further references see II AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION SECTION ON ANTI-
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has generally deferred to the antitrust enforcement agencies on mat-
ters of competition policy as it relates to the business aspects of
media enterprise.2 1
There is one narrowly defined statutory exemption for newspa-
pers,22 allowing newspapers otherwise competing in the same market
to enter into agreements sharing production facilities and business
functions, subject to three important conditions: (1) the newspapers
must maintain full editorial and reportorial independence from each
other; (2) all but one of the participating papers must be a "failing
newspaper," defined as "in probable danger of financial failure"; and
(3) the agreement must be reviewed and approved by the Attorney
General before it can take effect. The clear purpose of the exemption
was to preserve diversity of viewpoints and editorial policies within
communities in danger of becoming one-newspaper markets or worse;
but the agreements have not been successful in long-term preserva-
tion of newspaper competition in local markets. 23 Otherwise it does
not appear that the antitrust enforcement agencies have concerned
themselves with viewpoint diversity as such. One treatise character-
izes the present-day policy in this way: "Antitrust's overriding goal is
to maintain public confidence in the market mechanism by deterring
and punishing instances of economic oppression. '2 4
A well-known newspaper case illustrates the interaction between
the First Amendment, private conduct, and the competition laws. In
Associated Press v. U.S.,25 the Court had before it antitrust com-
plaints against a cooperative organization of which almost 1200
newspapers (nearly two-thirds of all daily English-language newspa-
pers then published in the country) were members, engaged in the
business of collecting, assembling and distributing news gathered by
its employees as well as by those of member papers. Several anti-
competitive practices were charged that were provided for under the
Associated Press's by-laws and enforced by significant sanctions:
member newspapers were (a) required to publish AP news items on a
regular basis, and (b) forbidden to sell news to any non-member pa-
pers or organizations; and (c) new members could be admitted by the
Board of Directors without a vote of the existing members, unless
they are or would be competing with an existing member, in which
case, if the existing member objected, admission of the new member
TRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1315 ff. (6th ed. 2007) (hereinafter
"Antitrust Developments 6th").
21. Antitrust Developments 6th, preceding note, at 1316.
22. The Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. ss. 1801 et seq (2008).
23. For a critical assessment of the law, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION
OF ANTITRUST LAW, FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAW ch. IX, pp.
241 ff. (2007).
24. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN AND WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK (2006) at p. 10.
25. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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required a four-fifths vote of the membership accompanied by oner-
ous financial conditions. The Court held that these practices were
indeed violations of the antitrust laws and that they were not pro-
tected by the First Amendment freedom of the press. "Freedom to
publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to
keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from govern-
mental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction
repression of that freedom by private interests. '26
II. SPECIFIC REGULATORY APPROACHES TO ACCOMMODATION
OF DIVERSE VIEWPOINTS
A. Broadcast Media under the Licensing System: Affirmative
Duties
1. Statutory Duties of Existing Licensees toward other
Viewpoints
a. "The public interest"
The Radio Act of 1927 established the general standard for issu-
ing and renewing licenses to broadcast as whether "the public
convenience, interest or necessity" would be served thereby, and this
language is retained in the present statute.27 As early as 1929, in an
order denying a license modification for a fiercely ideological radio
station, the FRC defined the purpose of the broadcast licensing sys-
tem as follows: "Broadcasting stations are licensed to serve the public
interest, and not for the purpose of furthering the private or selfish
interests of individuals or groups of individuals. '28 The U.S. Supreme
Court repeatedly sustained a broad interpretation of the scope of the
FCC's powers and discretion in determining what is "in the public
interest" within the meaning of the Communications Act of 1934,29
even as it occasionally sent a decision back to the agency for a fuller
explanation of why a particular ruling fit that standard.30 The Com-
mission, responding to technological developments but also to social
and political changes typically reflected in membership turnover, has
26. 326 U.S. at p.20. See also Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143
(1951), enjoining a newspaper from promoting a boycott of a local radio station, as an
unlawful attempt to monopolize a media market.
27. FCA Art. 307(a), (47 U.S.C. s. 307(a)).
28. Friendly, Good Guys, n. 11 above, at 19, quoting from Great Lakes Broadcast-
ing Co., 3 FRC An. Rep. 32 (1929).
29. E.g., NBC. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
30. E.g., F.C.C. v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86 (1953), holding that the
Commission had erred in issuing a license for a particular service in competition with
another license on the assumption that competition, if feasible, should always be fos-
tered, without making clear why it believed that such competition was in the public
interest.
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taken a variety of regulatory approaches to defining the concept over
its long history.3 1
b. "Equal Opportunities" rule during elections
The Radio Act of 1927 introduced a requirement for licensees
that, if they permit a candidate for any public office to use a broad-
casting station, they must afford "equal opportunities to all other
such candidates for that office" for such use, without the licensee hav-
ing any power of censorship over the material, but without any duty
to allow such use in the first place. 32 This conditional duty was car-
ried forward in the Communications Act of 1934, with provisions
regarding permissible charges for such use, and remains in the stat-
ute today.3 3 Subsequent amendments have provided substantial
elaboration, perhaps the most important of which is the 1959 clarifi-
cation that the obligation is not triggered by an appearance of such a
candidate on any bona fide newscast, news interview, news documen-
tary in which the appearance is incidental to the subject(s) covered,
or on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event.3 4 In 1969, in con-
junction with its review of the FCC's fairness doctrine, the Supreme
Court said of this statutory provision that its constitutionality "was
unquestioned. '3 5
c. Reasonable access for candidates in federal elections
Finally, a 1971 amendment to another provision of the Commu-
nications Act, adopted as part of a more comprehensive regulation of
federal election campaigns, provides as one of the permissible
grounds for revocation of a broadcast license or construction permit
the licensee's "willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to
or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time" for a qualified
candidate for federal elective office.3 6 This statutory reasonableness
standard has been applied liberally on a case-by-case basis by the
31. For an overview of this history identifying four distinct approaches reflected
in the FCC's rhetoric if not always its effective action, see Lili Levy, The Four Eras of
FCC Public Interest Regulation, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2008) (hereinafter "Levy,
Four Eras").
32. Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), sec. 18. This requirement is fre-
quently referred to as the "equal time rule," see Tillinghast, Another Look, n. 11
above, at p. 79.
33. Communications Act of 1934, s. 315, now codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. s.
315.
34. Pub.L. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557 (1959). This revision overruled a specific FCC
decision which treated newscast appearances by the incumbent mayor during a cam-
paign for re-election as entitling his opponent to an equal opportunity to appear. See
Friendly, Good Guys, n. 11 above, at 25-6.
35. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969).
36. FCA 1934 s. 312(a)(7), added by Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Title
I, Pub. L. 92-225 (1972). Sustained against First Amendment attack in CBS v. FCC,
453 U.S. 367 (1981).
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FCC, giving stations leeway to protect uniquely valuable time slots
and special services from the duty to accept campaign advertise-
ments, and the courts have sustained such an approach as consistent
with the broadcasters' First Amendment rights. 37
2. "Fairness Doctrine" in Broadcast Media
a. Origins
As indicated above, the Federal Radio Commission began its ex-
ercise of the licensing function by assuming that the general
statutory standard of "public interest, convenience or necessity" re-
quired it to deny licenses to broadcasters who were committed to a
particular set of interests or ideological views and to prefer those
which sought to reach the widest range of listeners. In effect, al-
though the Commission's earliest report on policies opposed
commercial advertising, this approach quickly turned to favoring
commercial stations offering mainstream, nationally oriented pro-
gramming with the widest variety of formats designed to reach the
largest possible audience. 38 It and its successor FCC developed this
interpretation into a more detailed set of obligations for licensees
over a number of years in the course of adjudicating complaints and
renewal applications, and articulated its position in a series of re-
ports and policy statements, all under the rubric of reasonable
interpretation of the statutory standard.39 In one of the earliest com-
prehensive statements of the doctrine, a 1949 report on editorializing
by broadcast licensees (which had been forbidden by earlier rules),
the overriding principle was stated as follows:
Licensee editorializing is but one aspect of freedom of ex-
pression by means of radio. Only in so far as it is exercised in
conformity with the paramount right of the public to hear a
reasonably balanced presentation of all responsible view-
points on particular issues can such editorialization be
considered to be consistent with the licensee's duty to oper-
ate in the public interest. 40
37. See Columbia Broadcasting System v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981); Telecommu-
nications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 510-514 (D.C.Cir. 1986).
38. See Levi, Four Eras, n. 31 above, at pp. 826 ff., with extensive references,
characterizing this as "the melting pot approach." On the influence and motivation of
the major broadcasters in this development, see Tillinghast, Another Look, n. 11
above, at ch. 5.
39. See Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council v. Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043,
1987 WL 344763 (FCC 1987), para. 25.
40. In the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949),
as quoted in FCC, 15th ANNUAL REPORT for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1949,
at p. 33. See Tillinghast, Another Look, n. 11 above, at p. 73.
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b. Elements
The fairness doctrine had several facets. The 1949 report in its
conclusion articulated two principal ones: (a) the duty of broadcasters
to devote a "reasonable percentage of their broadcasting time to the
discussion of public issues of interest in the community served by
their stations," and (b) the duty to design such programs "so that the
public has a reasonable opportunity to hear different opposing posi-
tions on the public issues of interest and importance in the
community."41 Two others were recognized as rights of affected per-
sons to be given air time to reply: (c) that of a person or group which
has been personally attacked by a broadcast (mentioned in the 1949
report), and (d) that of an opponent of a political candidate endorsed
or of a candidate editorially opposed by the station (clearly related to
the statutory "equal opportunities rule").42
c. Judicial evaluation of the doctrine and its scope
There was a great deal of debate over the fairness doctrine in the
period of the 1960's and 1970's, a time generally characterized by
great social and political upheaval over issues such as civil rights and
the Vietnam war, giving rise (among other things) to wide-ranging
skepticism toward federal regulation as such as well as increasing
local political activism. In this period, three landmark Supreme
Court decisions helped to define the scope of the doctrine and identify
its most contestable aspects, without invalidating either it or the
Commission's actual administration of it.
Confirmation of the doctrine's constitutionality. It was the "per-
sonal attack" rule, applied to broadcasts in the highly charged
atmosphere of a cold-war-era presidential campaign, which gave rise
to the Supreme Court's first full examination of the fairness doctrine
against a challenge under the First Amendment's freedoms of speech
and the press. 43 A small radio station in Pennsylvania owned by an
evangelical preacher was among hundreds of stations nationwide
which had carried a broadcast of a religious program in which an-
other evangelical preacher attacked the author of a book highly
critical of the 1964 Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwa-
ter. The attack was directed not only to the book but also to the
author personally, accusing the author of communist affiliations,
making false charges against others, and so on. The author sought
reply time from many of these stations, but refused to pay for it, and
41. See preceding note.
42. These rights of reply were eventually incorporated into formal rules specifring
procedures for providing the reply time, In the Matter of Amendment of Part 73 of the
Rules to Provide Procedures in the Event of a Personal Attack or Where a Station Edi-
torializes as to Political Candidates, 8 F.C.C.2d 721, 1967 WL 13878 (FCC).
43. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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the Pennsylvania station denied his request for free time. The author
complained to the FCC, and it found that the station under the cir-
cumstances was obliged to provide free time for a reply. While most of
the stations complied with the order, the Pennsylvania station did
not, and went to court to challenge the constitutionality of the FCC's
order as well as the fairness doctrine itself.44 The Supreme Court's
decision in the case45 held without dissent 46 that the fairness doc-
trine and specifically the personal attack rule were consistent with
the First Amendment freedoms and constituted reasonable applica-
tions of the statutory "public interest" standard. With respect to the
freedom of speech, the court relied principally on the unique nature of
the radio frequency spectrum, and characterized the consequences of
that situation for First Amendment protections in the following way:
Where there are substantially more individuals who want to
broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to
posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast
comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write,
or publish. If 100 persons want broadcast licenses, but there
are only 10 frequencies to allocate, all of them may have the
same "right" to a license, but, if there is to be any effective
communication by radio, only a few can be licensed, and the
rest must be barred from the airwaves ....
By the same token, as far as the First Amendment is con-
cerned ... the licensee has no constitutional right to be the
one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency
to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the
First Amendment which prevents the Government from re-
quiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to
conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to
present those views and voices which are representative of
his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be
barred from the airwaves ....
... It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount. 47
44. For an extended description of the political background of the case see
Friendly, Good Guys, n. 11 above, chs. 3 and 4.
45. For purposes of its decision, the Court joined Red Lion's appeal from a judg-
ment sustaining the FCC's position on the specific broadcast, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir.
1967), with the FCC's appeal from a judgment in another case, Radio-Television News
Directors Association v. FCC, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968) which held the right-of-
reply rules in their formal regulation form to be in violation of the First Amendment
rights of broadcasters.
46. Justice Douglas, who would have dissented, did not participate in the deci-
sion, having been unable to attend the oral argument due to illness.
47. 395 U.S. at pp. 388-390.
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Approval of the Commission's limits on the doctrine. In the year
immediately following the Red Lion decision, the Commission de-
cided a pair of cases testing the scope of a licensee's duty to "share his
frequency" under the fairness doctrine and the First Amendment in
light of that decision. Both-a complaint by an anti-Vietnam war ad-
vocacy group against a specific radio station and a request by the
Democratic National Committee for a declaratory ruling-attacked a
widespread policy of major networks of refusing to sell time for so-
called "editorial ads" expressing the advertiser's views on matters of
public concern; both argued that Red Lion confirmed the existence of
a right of access to broadcast media for "responsible groups." The
FCC rejected both petitions with respect to a right to buy time for
editorial ads, citing earlier rulings and policies emphasizing that
licensees had broad editorial discretion in determining how to meet
their obligation of reasonable and fair coverage of issues of public
concern, and that that part of the fairness doctrine does not provide
anyone else a right of access to the licensee's broadcast time. The Su-
preme Court sustained the FCC's decisions both on the statute and
on the First Amendment. 48 This time there were concurring and dis-
senting opinions disagreeing with important elements of the
majority's opinion. Justice Douglas concurred in the result, but would
have struck down the fairness doctrine altogether. 49 Justice Brennan
dissented, arguing that the licensees themselves act for the govern-
ment in exercising a monopoly, and are thus themselves be subject to
First Amendment obligations. 50
Rejection of similar rights of access to unregulated print media.
Five years after Red Lion, the Supreme Court had occasion to deal
with similar arguments concerning newspapers. In Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo51 it reviewed a Florida state law of long
standing but infrequent application, which granted a right of reply
analogous to the federal personal attack rule sustained in Red Lion,
though limited to candidates for public office attacked by any news-
paper regarding their personal character or official record. A
candidate with respect to whom a newspaper had published a nega-
tive editorial demanded that the paper publish his replies, the
newspaper refused, and the candidate brought suit in the state courts
seeking punitive damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief.
The newspaper challenged the law as a violation of First Amendment
freedoms, and the state Supreme Court sustained the law against
that challenge, finding that it did not infringe on the freedom of
speech but rather enhanced it by furthering the public interest in the
48. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
49. 412 U.S. at p. 154.
50. 412 U.S. at p. 196.
51. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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free flow of information. The U.S. Supreme Court, again without dis-
sent, reversed the state court's judgment and held that the law was
unconstitutional. It acknowledged the argument that newspapers (in
competition with new electronic media!) had become highly concen-
trated and held virtual monopolies in most markets. Nonetheless, it
rejected the inference, made by a number of "access advocates" based
in part on Red Lion,52 that government could properly remedy the
effects of such a concentration by imposing "fiduciary" obligations on
the owners, specifically by forcing a newspaper to "print that which it
would not otherwise print," which the Court characterized as "a com-
mand in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding
appellant to publish specified matter."53
In striking down the state right of reply law, none of the justices
referred to the Red Lion decision or to the broadcast medium which
that decision had treated so differently, leaving it to commentators
and perhaps its own future decisions to explain the difference. 54
Tornillo could be understood, however, as applicable in the regulated
media against an argument for restrictions on the freedom of speech
such as rights of access and regulation of program content, when it is
based on entry barriers attributable not to the inherent limitations of
the medium but to normal competition in the marketplace.
d. Evolution of the FCC's regulatory approach: to
deregulation-and back?
The political climate of the 60's and 70's appears to have induced
the FCC itself to shift its enforcement emphasis away from direct
monitoring of program content against a more or less national model
of diversity, toward establishing and monitoring a detailed "ascer-
tainment" process whereby broadcasters themselves determined
what local needs and interests exist in the communities served by
their stations and how to shape programming to meet them.5 5 Its
own record of enforcement of the fairness doctrine had become rather
loose, already relying primarily on overall reviews of periodic reports
and renewal applications from broadcasters to show balanced activity
rather than careful attention to their handling of specific issues,
aside from a few highly publicized cases arising out of complaints. 56
52. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press: A New First Amendment
Right, 80 HARVARD L. REV. 1641, esp. 1665-1666 (1967).
53. 418 U.S. at p. 256.
54. Friendly, Good Guys, n. 11 above, at p. 195, reports that this was a deliberate
omission, agreed to by the majority in order to achieve unanimity, when Justices
Douglas and Stewart would have refused to support an opinion that affirmed Red
Lion.
55. Levi, Four Eras, n. 31 above, at pp. 834 ff., characterizing this as "the commu-
nity representation approach."
56. Id. at pp. 836-7, esp. n. 87. See also Marvin Ammori, The Fairness Doctrine: A
Flawed Means to Attain a Noble Goal, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 881, 887 ff. (2008) (hereinaf-
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By the end of the 1970's the Commission's trend toward looser
regulation and enforcement blended into a full-blown deregulation
movement, led in national politics by Ronald Reagan's successful
presidential campaign of 1980 and supported by free-market eco-
nomic theory. The FCC came under new leadership appointed by
President Reagan, imbued with this market-oriented philosophy, and
proceeded to dismantle most of the non-statutory program content
regulations adopted in the previous fifty years, including the ones
embodying the "community representation approach" mentioned
above.57
Most instructively for our topic, the Commission in 1987 aban-
doned the original core of the fairness doctrine, not only on economic
principle but also on First Amendment grounds. 58 The foundation for
this ruling was an extensive report published by the Commission in
198559 which concluded on the basis of a review of enforcement his-
tory and comments from interested parties that the doctrine had the
effect of chilling and inhibiting free expression of views, causing
broadcasters to refrain from addressing controversial issues in order
to avoid having to give valuable time to competing viewpoints, and
creating opportunities for abuse for partisan political purposes. More-
over, it found that technological improvements since Red Lion had
made many more broadcast channels available, so that its scarcity
rationale no longer fit the facts. After some prodding by an appellate
court in a specific case, 60 the Commission rescinded the first two ele-
ments of the doctrine as inconsistent with the First Amendment not
merely as applied to that case but "on its face"; but that same court
sustained the ruling not on constitutionality but as a reasonable ex-
ercise of the Commission's delegated authority.61
As to the third and fourth elements of the doctrine, the individ-
ual rights of reply in case of personal attack or political editorial,
which had been transposed into formal rules prescribing procedures
for asserting the rights, the Commission was unable to make up its
mind. In 2000, after twenty years of Commission inaction on peti-
tions to reconsider these rules, capped by a failure to repeal them by
reason of a tie vote and a dithering response to a judicial order to
provide further justification for their retention in light of the aban-
donment of the first two elements, the federal appellate court ordered
ter "Ammori, Flawed Means"), citing statistics on complaint success rates in this
period.
57. Id. at pp. 841 ff. ("the market approach").
58. Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council v. Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 1987
WL 344763 (FCC 1987).
59. Inquiry into.., the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning Alterna-
tives to the General Fairness Doctrine, 102 F.C.C.2d 145 (1985).
60. Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F. 2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
61. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. den. 493
U.S. 1019 (1990).
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the Commission to repeal the rules. 62 Nonetheless the court explicitly
refrained from deciding whether similar rules might be reinstated
with a sufficient justification in terms of the public interest within
the constraints of the constitution. 63
In the last decade or so the FCC has taken some new public in-
terest regulatory initiatives which indicate some moderation of the
deregulation movement. The most interesting in terms of viewpoint
diversity came in 2008 with two simultaneous actions concerning "lo-
calism," television broadcasters' obligations to the communities
served by their stations. One was an order significantly expanding
reporting requirements concerning interactions with the communi-
ties served, along with a requirement that the TV broadcasters put
their public inspection files on line. 64 The other was a notice of pro-
posed rule-making seeking public comment, which would, among
other things, return to at least portions of the pre-1987 localism as-
certainment regime, including license renewal processes that require
the applicant to demonstrate satisfactory community programming
including public affairs, a requirement that each broadcaster have its
main studio in the community served, and that they set up commu-
nity advisory boards to help them keep abreast of community
needs. 65 So far no action has been taken on these latter proposals, but
if adopted they would likely attract judicial challenge.
e. Current status of Red Lion's broadcast exceptionalism
Although it had indicated in a decision handed down just before
the Commission's deregulation ruling that it might reconsider Red
Lion if Congress or the Commission showed that technology had over-
taken it,6 6 the Supreme Court-like the lower appellate courts-has
not taken occasion since then to treat that ruling as a basis for such
reconsideration. The Red Lion opinion itself specifically acknowl-
edged that, if experience with the fairness doctrine were to show that
it has "the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing the volume
and quality of coverage," reconsideration of its constitutionality
62. Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
63. Id. at p. 272.
64. See In the Matter of Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure Requirements For
Television Broadcast Licensee Public Interest Obligations, 23 F.C.C.R. 1274 (2008).
The questions on the disclosure form "can easily be read as an implicit return to con-
tent suggestions by the FCC," Levi, Four Eras at p. 845. A petition for review of this
order is pending in the federal appeals court.
65. FCC, Report on Broadcast Localism and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, doc.
FCC 07-218, adopted Jan 24, 2008, accessed 11/05/09 at FCC's Localism Proceedings
page http://www.fcc.gov/localismi.
66. FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), holding by
a narrow majority that Congress could not properly attach, as a condition of the re-
ceipt by a non-profit broadcaster of federal funds to support programming, a
prohibition against all editorializing by the broadcaster itself.
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would be in order,67 so that it can be said that the Commission's abo-
lition of the doctrine was consistent with Red Lion, in so far as its
finding of negative effect is empirically sound with respect to the par-
ticular regulations invalidated. Thus the statement about scarcity no
longer being an issue could be treated as unnecessary to the Commis-
sion's decision.
In any event, defenders of broadcast exceptionalism have argued
that "scarcity" in the ordinary sense of a commodity or resource oth-
erwise capable of private ownership is not what Red Lion is about,
but rather a "tragedy of the commons," a common good the use of
which must be regulated to avoid destruction of its value to all, and
that it is the need for public regulation which entails priority for the
interests of viewers and listeners over those of broadcasters.68 If the
technical capacity to accommodate an increased number of broadcast-
ers does not eliminate the need for regulation altogether, then the
public interest standard is still the appropriate determinant of how
much restriction on broadcaster freedom is justified. Thus the statu-
tory provisions embodying that standard, as well as giving rights of
reply to candidates or to purchase time for federal elections candi-
dates remain on the books and have been sustained, even though
repeated efforts to reinstate the fairness doctrine by legislation have
failed politically. 69
B. Statutory Rights of Access to Cable Systems ("Must-Carry") and
the First Amendment
In 1994 the Court had another occasion to consider the scope of
Red Lion, in relation to a statutory regulation of cable television, a
technology first introduced in the 1940's, over which the FCC had
only belatedly asserted regulatory authority in the 1960's and which
had since come to reach a significant majority of U.S. TV households.
In Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC,70 the Court reviewed a
so-called "must-carry" rule, enacted by Congress in 1992 after the
FCC's attempts at instituting the rule by regulation had twice been
struck down by a federal appellate court.71 The rule requires cable
systems to make at least one-third of their channel capacity available
to local broadcast stations that demand it, to be carried in full. If
67. 397 U.S. at p. 393.
68. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Three Cheers for Red Lion, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 861,
866ff. (2008); Levi, Four Eras, note 31 above, at pp. 819ff.
69. For an argument that reinstatement of the doctrine is unlikely to gain favor
from either major party, see Ammori, Flawed Means, n. 56 above, at 882f. (2008).
70. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
71. Communications Act of 1934, sec. 614, as added by Cable Television Con-
sumer Protection and Competition Act, U.S. Pub. L. 102-385 sec. 4 (1992), codified as
47 U.S.C. sec. 534(b) (2008). On the history of FCC regulation of cable, see Erik Forde
Ugland, Cable Television, New Technologies and the First Amendment after Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. V. FCC, 60 Missoum L. REV. 799 (1995).
[Vol. 58520
2010] POLITICAL OPINION AND THE CONCENTRATION OF MEDIA
more local stations request carriage than the system has channels
available, the cable operator has discretion to choose among them.
The stated purposes of the statute were (1) to preserve the benefits of
free local over-the-air broadcast television, (2) to promote the wide-
spread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources,
and (3) to promote fair competition in the market for television pro-
gramming. The Court, by a sharply divided vote, reversed a lower
court's judgment in favor of the government, and remanded the case
to the lower court for an evidentiary hearing on whether or not local
broadcasters were in fact in danger of being driven out of their mar-
kets, and whether less intrusive means existed for preserving the
viability of over-the-air broadcasters. This time, however, it did not
simply ignore the government's argument that Red Lion supported
such a right of access, 72 but rather declared the rationale of that case
to be inapplicable to the cable medium. The plurality opinion distin-
guished the two media:
The broadcast cases are inapposite in the present context be-
cause cable television does not suffer from the inherent
limitations of the broadcast medium. Indeed, given the rapid
advances in fiber optics and digital compression technology,
soon there may be no practical limitation on the number of
speakers who may use the cable medium. Nor is there any
danger of physical interference between two cable speakers
attempting to share the same channel. In light of these fun-
damental technological differences between broadcast and
cable transmission, application of the more relaxed standard
of scrutiny adopted in Red Lion and the other broadcast
cases is inapt when determining the First Amendment valid-
ity of cable regulation.73
Instead the justices evaluated the must-carry rule for cable
under general First Amendment doctrine, and split over (a)-
whether the rule should be considered content-based or content-neu-
tral for purposes of defining which burden of justification is
applicable, and (b) whether this measure would even satisfy the re-
quirements for content-neutral restrictions. The narrow majority
concluded that the rule was content-neutral, and that the stated gov-
72. Specifically, the government argued that Red Lion was based not merely on
the physical characteristics of the medium, but also on the existence of a "market
dysfunction," noting the decision's reliance on the antitrust case Associated Press v.
U.S., described above (text at ns. 25 and 26) for the proposition that the First Amend-
ment does not protect a private actor's suppression of others' private speech. See Brief
of the Federal Appellees, 1993 WL 796837, at p. 17. The plurality rejected this argu-
ment, both as a misdescription of the basis of the broadcast cases and as inapplicable
in any event to non-broadcast cases, which clearly do not support market dysfunction
in itself as a basis for relaxing the First Amendment standard. 512 U.S. at p. 640.
73. 512 U.S. at 638-9.
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ernmental interest was sufficiently important under that standard,
but that the record established by the court below was insufficient to
show that the viability of the local broadcast stations was sufficiently
under threat to justify such an intrusion into the First Amendment
rights of the cable companies. The dissenters argued that the statute,
being intended to promote specific programming interests (diversity
of viewpoints, localism, educational programs, and news and public
affairs) through the locality requirement, was content-based and
therefore subject to strict scrutiny. They found localism and diversity
of viewpoints to be less than compelling governmental interests, and
the restriction on cable owners' rights not narrowly tailored to the
potentially compelling interests of preferring educational or public af-
fairs programming, since it would presumably displace cable
programming having similar purposes.74 They would, therefore, sim-
ply have reversed the judgment below and entered final judgment for
the operators. On remand to the lower court the parties developed a
much-expanded record showing the factual basis for the statute, and
the court again rendered judgment for the government. The Supreme
Court affirmed, by the same five-four vote on essentially the same
issues as on the first decision. 75
III. REGULATING CONCENTRATION: FCC CONTROLS ON
OWNERSHIP OF MEDIA OUTLETS
A. Origins and Early Judicial Evaluation
Beginning in the late 1930's, the FCC began regulating the num-
ber of broadcast media outlets any one person or entity could own,
justifying these limits primarily in terms of the public interest in
viewpoint diversity on matters of public concern. 76 The limits were
keyed to local market, national market, and particular medium (AM
and FM radio, television, eventually cable and newspapers-num-
bers of outlets in any one format, and cross-ownership of outlets in
different formats). The earliest rules precluded multiple licenses to
the same entity for AM or for FM in the same area, and imposed a
national limit on the ownership of TV stations to three. The progres-
sion of amendments to such rules, like that of the program content
regulations, followed the development of technologies which in gen-
eral tended to increase the number of outlets available. Three
Supreme Court decisions are useful in tracing early developments
74. 512 U.S. at 680-681 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
76. On the history of these regulations, with extensive references, see Adam
Candeub, Media Ownership Regulation, the First Amendment, and Democracy's Fu-
ture, 41 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1556 ff. (2008) (hereinafter "Candeub, Media
Ownership").
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and setting the statutory and constitutional framework for ownership
rules.
In 1943 the Court had before it challenges to the FCC's Chain
Broadcasting Regulations governing the relationships between indi-
vidual station licensees and radio networks, which restricted a
variety of anti-competitive practices of the networks having the effect
of unduly limiting the station's control over programming decisions. 77
One provision dealt directly with network ownership of licensed sta-
tions, and established the principles that licenses should not be
issued to a network for more than one station in the same service
area and that a network should not be licensed for a standard station
in an area in which the existing standard stations are so few or so
undesirable that granting the network license would substantially re-
strain competition. While this provision was not discussed separately
in relation to the Commission's powers, it was sustained along with
the others, under both the statute (including the authority to regu-
late competition) and the First Amendment. 78
U.S. v. Storer Broadcasting Co.7 9 reviewed the FCC's 1953-4 re-
visions of its national limits on owning multiple licenses. This
revision80 adopted the "rule of seven": issuance of license to a broad-
caster who already has stations would be denied "if the grant of the
license would result in a concentration of control" of broadcasting in
the particular service "in a manner inconsistent with public interest,
convenience, or necessity," taking into account a variety of factors;
but it would in any event be considered that such a concentration
would occur if the applicant already held seven stations in the same
service (AM, FM, or TV). Moreover, the regulations used a prophylac-
tic definition of "ownership": if the applicant or "any stockholder,
office or director of [the applicant] directly or indirectly, owns, oper-
ates, controls, or has any interest in, or is an officer or director of'
another station in the same service, the rule applies.8 ' The Court
held that the rules were within the regulatory power of the FCC, and
that the procedure was adequate to satisfy the requirements of due
process.
In 1975 the Commission, in an overall review of multiple owner-
ship rules which had already resulted in regulations strengthening
the prohibition against owning or controlling more than one broad-
77. National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
78. The Court's decision was its first to articulate the scarcity rationale for broad-
cast exceptionalism in relation to the freedoms of speech and press. Id. at p. 226-227.
79. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
80. The first version had 7 AM, 5 FM, or 5 TV stations as its limits, and it was
this version that was attacked in the Court; but the fact that the FCC amended its
rule to raise the FM and TV limits also to 7 before the judgment was rendered did not
affect the outcome.
81. 351 U.S. at 194n.1.
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cast license in the same area,8 2 completed the process by extending
this prohibition to the common ownership or control of a licensed
broadcast station and a newspaper in the same community.8 3 The
rule forbade new combinations however formed (new licenses or
transfer of existing licenses to newspapers, or renewals to licensees
that have acquired newspapers), as well as the transfer of existing
newspaper-broadcast combinations to the same person or entity, but
it required divestiture of one or the other outlet by existing combina-
tions only in a small number of "egregious" cases. The Commission
explained this shift from what had been a case-by-case treatment of
such combinations, which often accepted newspaper applications for
broadcast licenses, in terms of the "maturity" of the broadcast media:
the licenses are "worth applying for" in their own right, so that other
"qualified and experienced applicants can be expected to step for-
ward. '84 Now, the likelihood that a newspaper-owned license "is not
going to enhance diversity" in local broadcast media became disposi-
tive. 85 With respect to divestiture of existing combinations, the
Commission took a nuanced view, which emphasized the difference
between its mission and that of antitrust authorities, the latter con-
cerned with competition in advertising and market share, the former
concerned with "diversity of viewpoints from antagonistic sources."8 6
From the diversity perspective, it concluded that "because of the dis-
ruption and losses which could be expected to attend divestiture-
resulting in losses or diminution of service to the public-divestiture
should be limited to use only in the most egregious cases. '87 Review-
ing a lower court judgment which rejected the divestiture rule as
arbitrary, the Supreme Court sustained the regulation in its entirety
against challenge based both on the underlying statute and on the
First Amendment. 88 Specifically, it found the Commission's priority
for the diversity goal and its assumption that diversity of ownership
would enhance the possibility of diversity of viewpoints to be "ra-
tional" in light of the earlier cases and the language of the statute.89
82. Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broad-
cast Stations, First Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970). This order extended
what had been a prohibition against "duopoly" in the same broadcast service to cross-
service ownership and control.
83. Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broad-
cast Stations, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975). The rules applied
only to commercial media, not to non-profits or educational institutions.
84. Id. at para. 100.
85. Id. at para. 101.
86. Id. at para. 111. It appears, indeed, that a number of Justice Department peti-
tions to the FCC to deny specific license renewals involving broadcast-newspaper
combinations, thought by many to be motivated by the Nixon administration's hostil-
ity to newspapers, was a prime stimulus to the FCC's rule-making decision. See
Candeub, Media Ownership, note 76 above, at 1567ff.
87. Id. at para. 112.
88. FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
89. 436 U.S. at 796f.
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With respect to the claim that the regulation violated the First
Amendment rights of newspapers, the Court cited Red Lion for the
proposition that no one has a First Amendment right to a broadcast
license in light of the nature of the medium, and that denial of a li-
cense in the public interest is not a denial of free speech. 90
B. Recent Efforts at Deregulation
The multiple ownership rules as a means of promoting diversity
of viewpoint proved more resistant to deregulation than did content
control measures like the fairness doctrine. The first move on the
part of the FCC came in 1984, when it changed the "Rule of 7" to a
"Rule of 12" to define the maximum number of licenses a single entity
could control nationally in each of the service categories (AM, FM,
and TV).91 In doing so, the Commission relied both on a dramatic
increase in the overall number of stations in the country 92 and on a
greatly expanded range of non-broadcast media sources it considered
relevant to the public interest in diversity,93 in addition to evidence
that larger organizations were regarded as more reliable and more
likely to provide public interest programming than single-station
owners.9 4 The majority of the Commission clearly viewed these find-
ings as a basis for ending all restrictions on national ownership,
concluding that they do not help the individual viewer whose rele-
vant market is local,95 but decided to postpone action on that goal for
six years to allow for reconsideration after experience with relaxed
limits. 96 On reconsideration of this amendment after Congress
blocked its implementation, the Commission dropped the six-year
"sunset" provision and added as a second limiting factor the maxi-
mum share of the total national broadcast audience that any one
entity can reach, which was set at 25%.97
A much broader statutory deregulation of the ownership rules
came with the Telecommunications Act of 1996,98 which had the
90. Id. at 799f.
91. Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast
Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984).
92. Id. at paras. 4 and 24, the latter noting that a 12-station owner in 1984 had a
smaller percentage of the total than did a 7-station owner in 1953 when the rule of 7
was adopted.
93. Id. at para. 30, identifying cable, videocassette recorders, newspapers,
magazines, books, and other electronic video sources as media to be considered in
evaluating diversity concerns.
94. Id. at paras. 44ff. and 82ff.
95. Id. at paras. 60ff.
96. Id. at para. 112.
97. Rules Related to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcast
Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 74 (1984). The revision also dropped a "sunset" provision
which would have caused the entire package of limitations to expire altogether in 6
years unless subsequent developments warranted some continuation.
98. Pub.L. no. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
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stated purpose of "promoting competition and reducing regulation" in
the field. The Act specifically directed the Commission to amend its
regulations to eliminate national limits on the number of stations
owned by one entity, both with respect to radio99 and television, 100
and to raise the maximum national audience share for any one televi-
sion owner from 25% to 35%.101 A new formula was required for
determining the number of commercial radio stations that can be
commonly owned at the local level, keyed to the total number of such
stations in the market and with maximums ranging from eight in the
larger markets (forty-five+ stations) to five or half the total-which-
ever is smaller-in smaller markets (fourteen or fewer stations). 10 2
With respect to local television ownership, the Act ordered the Com-
mission to expand its program of waivers of the existing anti-duopoly
rule to the fifty largest markets, and to conduct an investigation and
rule-making proceeding to determine whether it should retain, mod-
ify or eliminate any of its rules governing the number of permissible
co-ownerships. 10 3 Finally, and in the outcome most tellingly, it or-
dered the Commission to conduct biennial (since 2004, quadrennial)
reviews of all of its ownership rules, including the ones commanded
by the Act, to determine "whether any of such rules are necessary in
the public interest as the result of competition" and to "repeal or mod-
ify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public
interest."10 4
Since the Telecommunications Act of 1996 took effect, the FCC
has conducted several comprehensive reviews of the ownership rules
pursuant to the statutory mandate, and each time it has attempted
revisions it has been largely overruled by appellate courts, typically
on the ground that it did not provide an adequate justification for its
action under the public interest standard and the specific require-
ments of the statute. The decisions so challenged included both
retentions and relaxations of existing restrictive rules, and the result
has been that almost all of the statutory rules have remained in
force.
In its first review beginning in 1998, the FCC decided to retain
the national TV ownership audience cap at 35% and the prohibition
against common ownership of a cable system and a TV broadcast sta-
tion in the same market, 10 5 and both decisions were challenged in
federal appeals court by network and cable system owners. The court
99. Id. sec. 202(a).
100. Id. sec. 202(c)(1)(A).
101. Id. sec. 202(c)(1)(B).
102. Id. sec. 202(b).
103. Id. sec. 202(d) and 202(c)(2) respectively.
104. Id. sec. 202(h).
105. 1998 Review of Broadcast Ownership Rules, 15 F.C.C.R. 11058 (2000), at
11073ff. (TV ownership) and 11114ff. (Cable/TV cross-ownership).
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found that both retention decisions were inadequately supported by
the reasons given in light of the record. 10 6 Regarding the national
audience cap the court noted that the FCC asserted that national di-
versity was important but failed to explain why it no longer adhered
to the contrary view expressed in the 1984 review, and it asserted a
need to observe the effects of the statutory changes of 1996 despite
the statute's presumption that any restrictive rule should be elimi-
nated or modified. 10 7 With respect to the cable/television cross-
ownership rule, the court found the FCC's reasoning-that the rule is
necessary to prevent discrimination by the cable owner against other
broadcasters-to be unresponsive to cable owners' objections, and in-
consistent with its relaxation, in a separate proceeding, of the
prohibition against ownership of more than one TV station in the
same market.108 That local TV ownership rule change,10 9 in turn,
was reviewed later by the same court and found to be inadequately
supported in one respect.' 10 The FCC had decided to modify the flat
prohibition against duopolies, by redefining the relevant local market
(not measured by signal coverage, but by commercial rating areas)
and by allowing dual ownership provided that (1) the stations' signals
don't overlap, (2) one of the two is not in the top four rated stations in
the market, and (3) at least eight independently owned, full-power
TV stations remain whose signals overlap with at least one of the two
co-owned ones. The court found that the Commission had not ade-
quately explained why non-broadcast media (specifically, general-
circulation daily newspapers and cable systems) were not included in
the list of "remaining voices" to be counted, whereas they were in an-
other rule relaxation using the same criterion, that of cross-
ownership of local radio and TV stations. 1 None of these court rul-
ings questioned the basic concept of broadcast exceptionalism with
regard to freedom of speech.112
106. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (C.A.D.C. 2002), modified
on rehearing 293 F.3d 537 (2002).
107. 280 F.3d at 1042ff. The same court had rejected a similar national market
share limit on cable systems, which the FCC had set at 30% on the premise that that
would protect against a program producer seeking access to s cable system from being
blocked by two rejections, on the ground that the underlying assumptions about com-
petition and what it would take to open the field for independent programmers were
purely conjectural. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 249 F.3d 1126 (C.A.D.C.
2001). The Commission reconsidered and readopted the 30% rule with equally non-
empirical justification, and the court rejected it, in Comcast v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1 (2009).
108. 280 F.3d at 1049ff.
109. Regulation Governing Television Broadcasting, 14 F.C.C.R. 12903 (1999).
110. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (C.A.D.C. 2002).
111. 284 F.3d at 162ff., noting in particular that the FCC claimed regarding the TV
duopoly rule that broadcast television was the dominant source of news in most mar-
kets, while citing studies which in fact did not distinguish between broadcast and
cable.
112. See Candeub, Media Ownership, note 76 above, at 1555f.
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All of these remands were consolidated into the Commission's
next biennial review with a new chair in full deregulatory mode, re-
sulting in a 2003 order which reviewed all six ownership rules,
liberalizing five of them and retaining one unchanged. 113 The local
TV ownership rule was modified to allow as many as three stations to
be co-owned in markets with eighteen or more stations, without
changing either the definition or the number of independent voices
that must remain. The local radio ownership rule was modified to use
a geographic rather than signal-based definition of market and by
including non-commercial stations in the count, without changing the
numerical limitation. The local newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership
rule and the local TV/radio cross-ownership rule were merged into a
single cross-media rule. The national TV ownership rule based on au-
dience share was raised to 45%.114 The "dual network rule," which
allows common ownership of more than one broadcast network but
forbids merger of any of the top four in market share, was retained
without change. The underlying factual assumption of the majority
opinion was that the advent of cable, satellite and internet had pro-
duced a situation of abundance in most markets, 115 and that effective
competition by broadcasters with the new non-broadcast media re-
quires new efficiencies. 1 16 A challenge by public interest and
consumer advocacy groups was heard not in the FCC's home base of
the District of Columbia but in a different circuit, and it was
successful. 1 7
Of particular interest in the Third Circuit's analysis is its ques-
tioning of a central concept in the Commission's local ownership and
cross-ownership rules, namely that within any given media type, all
outlets are to be counted equal, regardless of their actual market
shares. The new local TV ownership rule did prohibit combinations of
the top four stations in the market, but in determining whether own-
ership of as many as three stations is permissible it was the total
number of outlets rather than their individual market shares that
counted, and the merger of any top-four with any two of the others
counted the same as a merger of the smallest three. The court found
the Commission's explanation, that market share is too fluid to be a
113. Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R.
13620 (2003).
114. While the court challenge was pending, this particular change was overruled
by Congress, which amended the Telecommunications Act of 1996 sec. 202(c) to set
the audience share cap at 39%, and amended sec. 202(h) to exclude that provision
from periodic review by the FCC. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L.
108-199, sec. 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99-100 (2004).
115. Id. at paras. 86ff.
116. Id., e.g., at para.138.
117. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (C.A. 3d Cir. 2003).
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reliable measure in itself, to be irrational and self-contradictory. 118
The common cross-media ownership rule was a complicated one
which divided local markets into three categories: those with three or
fewer television stations (smallest), those with nine or more televi-
sion stations (largest), and those in between; it then forbade all cross-
media ownership in the smallest, allowed a wide variety of cross-own-
ership scenarios in the largest, and excluded one such (one
newspaper and two TV stations) in the middle category. In making
these calculations, the rule used a "diversity index" which took into
account six media types (daily or weekly newspapers, radio, broad-
cast television and cable or dial-up internet), assigned a relative
value to each type based on national usage patterns, treated each
outlet within each media type as if it had the same market share,
then used the sum of the squares of each outlet's market share as an
indicator of concentration (the higher the number the greater the risk
of harmful concentration). The court found that the assumptions un-
derlying this index were faulty in three respects: its omission of cable
as a relevant local medium was not supported by the record, it irra-
tionally treated each outlet within a category as having equal market
shares (thus arriving at the lowest possible aggregate number for
concentration purposes), and it reached conclusions that were not
consistent with its stated formulas. 119 Finally, the Commission's de-
cision to retain the existing numerical limits on local radio station
ownership, after redefining the relevant market and including non-
commercial stations in the count (both of which changes were ap-
proved by the court), was based on a game-theory analogy which
presupposed a minimum number of roughly equal competitors to as-
sure the benefits of competition; it determined that the minimum
number was five, and that the existing multi-tiered limits guaran-
teed at least that number of roughly equal competitors in all but the
smallest markets.' 20 The court found that the Commission had not
adequately explained why the standard should be five roughly equal
competing firms, and that it was quite irrational and factually incor-
rect to assume that the limiting numbers (which had been in place
since they were introduced by the 1996 statute) would produce that
competitive structure.' 21 Thus all of the proposed changes were re-
manded for further consideration, leaving the pre-2002 rules intact
except for the national TV audience share cap which was changed by
Congress, and were carried over to the next review.
118. 373 F.3d at 418f.
119. 373 F.3d at 404ff.
120. 18 F.C.C.R. 13620, at paras. 289ff.
121. 373 F.3d at 433ff.
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The most recent review produced a report and order in 2007,122
which revived only one of the Commission's 2003 proposals for
change, and that only partially: a relatively modest modification of
the absolute ban on newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership based on
the court's agreement that the ban was no longer necessary in the
public interest. 123 Specifically, the attempt at a common rule for all
cross-media ownership was abandoned, as was the hopelessly confus-
ing "diversity index," and a presumption against allowing newspaper/
broadcast cross-ownership was retained for the great majority of
markets. That presumption was reversed only for the largest twenty
markets, for one-paper/one broadcast station combinations only, and
with conditions attached to newspaper/television combinations: (1)
that the television station is not ranked in the top four in the market
area, and (2) that there are at least eight independent "major media
voices" remaining in the area.124 As to what voices to count as "ma-
jor" the Commission concluded that daily newspapers, radio and
broadcast television are still the primary sources that people rely on
for news, especially local news, whereas on the available data it was
impossible to evaluate the contribution of other electronic media such
as cable and the internet to this specific concern. 125 The Commission
insists on a case-by-case analysis, however, and requires considera-
tion of a wide variety of factors in deciding whether or not either
presumption should be overcome in a given case;126 in this context
the conceded contribution of cable and internet to viewpoint diversity
becomes important in justifying the presumption that allowing news-
paper/broadcast combinations in the largest markets will not harm
that interest. 127 The concern here was the weak economic situation in
the newspaper industry, endangering the most significant media in-
vestment in local news if they are unable to diversify their revenue
base; but only in the largest markets is there sufficient diversity of
media present to absorb the concentration effects of the paperfV
combination. 128 On the other hand many such combinations did exist
which the ban of 1975 had not required to be divested, and some had
enhanced local news production. 129 Court challenges are pending at
the present writing which apparently involve both the change and
some of the retentions, but at least one commentator believes that
122. 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review - Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1994, 23 F.C.C.R. 2010 (2007).
123. Id. at paras. 18ff.
124. Id. at para.53.
125. Id. at paras. 53ff.
126. Id. at paras. 68ff., listing four factors to be considered in deciding on a request
for waiver in smaller markets.
127. Id. at para. 59.
128. Id. at paras. 27ff.
129. Id. at paras. 42ff.
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the new rule will hold up in court, although efforts in Congress to
overturn it by statute could render the judicial review moot. 130
IV. CONCLUSION
Viewpoint diversity, at least at the local level, is clearly a legiti-
mate goal of broadcast and cable regulation, furthering the public
interest in access to a wide variety of information and opinions on
matters of public concern. The question of what kind of regulation of
broadcasters' freedom of speech is appropriate to achieve that goal,
however, is one to which there is not a permanent answer. Certainly
the recent trend- responding to technological improvements which
make room for more broadcasters, as well as to general First Amend-
ment doctrine-is to disfavor measures to control content, such as the
fairness doctrine, and to prefer those which are more structural, such
as ownership controls designed to promote greater numbers of inde-
pendent voices. To the extent that the latter are successful, the
fairness doctrine in its various manifestations is likely to remain on
the sidelines. On the other hand the Commission has had great diffi-
culty persuading the courts that there is an empirical correlation
between any particular number of independently owned "voices" and
a properly representative diversity of viewpoint.
In the commentary there remains widespread concern about the
quality of coverage of public affairs, in particular the strong tendency
toward polarization and partisanship in reporting which has cer-
tainly increased since the FCC's abandonment of most content
regulation; 13 1 but even here proposals favor less coercion and con-
tent-control and more attention to structure. 132 It remains to be seen
whether and how the FCC itself will follow through on its localism
initiatives, 133 but its most important improvement could be the gen-
eration of a wide range of reliable information about media
operations and market situation, the lack of which has so troubled
courts and critics.134
130. Alicia Flarity, David Slays Goliath: The Fight Against the FCC's Recent Relax-
ation of the Newspaper-Broadcast cross-Ownership Rule, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 261
(2009), at 280ff (judicial scrutiny) 284ff (Congressional efforts).
131. Levi, Four Eras, n. 31 above, at 853 ff.
132. See Ammori, Flawed Means, n. 56 above, at 892 ff. Another suggestion is to
restructure the concept of the local market so as to make it coincide to a greater de-
gree with political boundaries, thereby enhancing the media's function as agent for
the citizen in monitoring the performance of governmental officials. Candeub, Media
Ownership, n. 76 above, at 1585ff.
133. Above, text at notes 64-65.
134. See, e.g., Philip M. Napoli, Paradoxes of Media Policy Analysis: Implications
for Public Interest Media Regulation, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 801, 804f. (2008).
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